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Abstract
Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two
things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model
and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models
fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving
the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic
corruptive eects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular
terms in linguistic communication.
1 Introduction
What is it to be confused about the identity of an object? People often confuse things.
They think one thing is two or two things are one. Also, ever since Frege argued
for the distinction between sense and reference, this type of mistake has been the
driving force behind a host of inuential arguments and theories in philosophy of
language and mind. Until recently, however, theorists did not pay much attention to
the metaphysics of confused mental states. The point of this paper is to argue for and
present a new metaphysical theory of confusion, called the ‘Frege model.’
In §2 I describe two independently plausible models of confused identity. The rst
is the Frege model already mentioned and the second is called the ‘Millikan model.’ In
§3 I present an argument against the Frege model—called the objection from unavailable
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representation—and show in some detail why it fails. In addition, I argue that the model
is superior both in terms of descriptive and explanatory adequacy.
Interestingly, however, many of the insights of the Millikan model can, and should,
be incorporated into our nal theory of confused identity. As Ruth Millikan has argued
extensively, confused identity is a type of corruption of the proper function of our
capacity to reidentify particulars. In §4, I explain how Millikan’s notion of proper
functions can be applied to the case of confused identity, rst in thought and then in
communication. Particularly, I show how confusion essentially disrupts the proper
function of singular terms in natural language, even if the Frege model is correct.
2 Two models of the mental state of confusion
Confused identity is a mental state of two basic types. Combinatory confusion is when
an agent takes two things to be a single thing. Separatory confusion is when an agent
takes a single thing to be two things. In principle an agent can be confused by taking
n things to be m things for any distinct natural numbers n and m. For convenience,
I focus only on the more simple cases.1 A dog who holds a bone in his mouth and
takes its reection in a pond to be a dierent bone suers, albeit momentarily, from
separatory confusion. Another dog who chases two similar rabbits, only ever seeing
one of them at any given moment, might suer from combinatory confusion. If the
rabbits switch roles behind a rock, appearing to the dog as if a single running rabbit
disappears from sight only for a moment, he seems to have some kind of mental
representation that is supposed to help him track a single rabbit but really tracks two
rabbits.
2.1 Frege vs. Millikan
How exactly should confusions like those attributed to the two dogs be explained and
modeled? There seem to be two plausible ways to go here (cf. Lawlor 2005).
1Note that this is not supposed to be an analysis of the meaning of the word ‘confusion’ in English.
The characterization is an attempt to describe what confusion itself consists in. It seems like the word
‘confusion’ is partly negative and is not properly applied, in English, unless the agent is taken to bear
some responsibility for their sorry epistemic state. This would arbitrarily disqualify many cases that a
general theory of confusion ought to capture. Further, theorists who have written specically about
confusion tend to think only of combinatory confusion (cf. Camp 2002; Lawlor 2007). This may simply
reect common beliefs about the etymology and morphology of the lexical item ‘confusion’ in English.
Translations into other languages do not always give rise to the same tendency (German ‘Verwirrung,’
Icelandic ‘ruglingur,’ etc.). But of course there is a strong tradition of discussing separatory confusions
under the head of Frege’s puzzle.
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1. Frege model. According to this model confusion is a mental state that consists in
someone’s having identity beliefs that are false. It is on this basis that Fregeans
have postulated modes of presentation or senses as semantic values for linguistic
or mental representations. A mode of presentation can be thought of as an
identifying condition that is specied by a description. Most famously, Frege
proposed that someone might think of Venus via the identifying condition of
being the morning star or of being the evening star. And it is not necessary that
they realize that these conditions determine the very same object. Modes of
presentation, however, are an optional feature of the Frege model. It is ‘Fregean’
only because of its role in some of the most inuential arguments for postulating
such modes. But let us state the model more precisely.
Frege model of confusion
Speaker A suers from confused identity at time t i there are singular
terms a and b and propositional attitudes V and W that A explicitly holds
at t, such that (i) A V s that Fa, (ii) A W s that Gb, and only one of (iii–iv)
is true; (iii) a = b and A believes that a 6= b (or lacks the belief that a = b),
(iv) a 6= b and A believes that a = b (or lacks the belief that a 6= b).2
‘F ’ and ‘G’ are arbitrary predicate expressions of the speaker’s language, stand-
ing for any two properties A can cognitively represent. They can, for example, be
identical or mutually exclusive. Similarly,V andW can be, for example, the same
(e.g. belief), completely dierent (e.g. hope and fear respectively), or mutually
exclusive (e.g. belief and disbelief respectively). Finally, the denition employs
the terminology of explicit propositional attitudes ‘at a time.’ What this means
is just that there is some specic time span in which A has two explicit mental
states whose contents represent a and b. In many cases, the two states can be
collapsed into a single mental state whose content represents a relation holding
between a and b, i.e. (i–ii) can be: A V s that Rab. But the terminology is used
here, rstly, to exclude cases where the mental states occur at two very distant
points in time and, secondly, to contrast them with the identity beliefs (iii–iv)
that A may have implicitly.
2To be clear, the denition is intended in such a manner that A V s or W s the proposition associated
with the expression ‘that Fa.’ That is, A does not stand in propositional attitude relations to particular
sentence types or tokens containing singular terms a and b, but only to the propositions, whatever
they turn out to be, associated, whatever that relation really is, with the sentences. Also, by ‘singular
term’ I mean any expression that the speaker intends to stand for an object, it need not be a referring
expression; it can be a proper name, demonstrative, indexical or a denite description used referentially.
See also §4.1 below. Note, nally, that, in the terminology introduced in the next section, the Frege
model is couched entirely in the t-language, not in the c-language.
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2. Millikan model. Ruth Millikan (1994, 1997, 2000) develops a subtle theory of
confused thoughts. On her view, confused identity cannot consist in having
a false belief about an identity, rather, it is an error of its own kind (1994: 96,
2000: 173). In the ‘central cases,’ misidentifying the object of one’s thought is ‘an
act that muddies the thought involved, corrupting the inner representational
system’ (1994: 75). This is taken to mean that confused representations involve
concepts that are themselves confused. Here is how I propose, in more detail,
to esh out the Millikan model. To be clear, the formulation is inuenced by
Millikan, but it is not intended as a perfect exposition of her broader view. I
want to focus on the model in its own right. A confused singular representation
is one where the number of objects it actually applies to diers from the number
of objects it is, in eect, taken to apply to by its user. Consider the dog chasing
two rabbits. He, let us suppose, possesses a singular representation or quasi-
representation CR such that it actually applies to a spatially discontinuous object
that consists of two individual rabbits, RabbitA and Rabbit B. The representation
CR is corrupt, however, since its proper function is to apply to a single spatially
continuous object and, one may add, the dog seems to quasi-believe that CR
really performs this function.3
Now consider separatory confusion. Suppose that the dog carrying the bone
in his mouth has a singular representation or quasi-representation CB of that
particular bone. On the Millikan model, as soon as the dog confuses the reec-
tion of the CB-bone in the pond for some dierent bone, his tokening of the
CB-representation applies to nothing. It applies to nothing because there is no
object which consists of that-bone-in-the-mouth without consisting of that-pond-
reected-bone at the same time. So the CB-representation actually applies to no
object, although its proper function is to apply to a single spatially continuous
object.
It should be noted here, in particular, that the Frege model implies that cases that
David Kaplan (1968, 2013) and others have described in terms of suspended judgment
are in fact cases of confusion. This may seem implausible but the following argument
indicates otherwise.
Here is a typical scenario in which a speaker (call her ‘Lois Lane #1’) satises
the Fregean denition of confusion. Lois #1 believes that Superman can y. She also
believes that Clark Kent cannot y. As a matter of fact (assuming this is fact rather than
ction), Clark Kent is Superman. And, nally, Lois #1 does not believe that Clark Kent
is Superman. Now consider a case that is less typical (relative to the massive literature
3The notion of ‘proper function’ is explained in §4 below.
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on paradigm confusion cases). Another Lois—‘Lois #2’—is likewise confused, on the
proposed denition, if she hopes that Superman saves her and wonders whether Clark
Kent has read Shakespeare while not believing that Superman is Clark Kent, possibly
even suspending belief.
Many philosophers have argued that someone like Lois #1 is confused but not
irrational. On one account of directly referential singular terms, however, it would
follow that Lois #1 is being irrational, because she has inconsistent beliefs about Su-
perman/Clark Kent. Let us call this account ‘Millianism.’ According to Millianism the
content of a belief expressed by referring directly to object o will have an o-dependent
truth condition.
What about Lois #2? On my denition she is also confused about the identity of
Superman/Clark Kent. Here is my reason for taking this view. At time t, let us assume,
Lois #2 tokens the hope that Superman saves her and the wondering-whether Clark
Kent reads Shakespeare. But it is not the case at t that Lois #2 believes explicitly that
(1) λx〈she tokened the hope that x saves her and she tokened the wondering-
whether x reads Shakespeare〉o.
Where o = Superman = Clark Kent. Still, this very belief can be derived from the set
of her beliefs at t and is then, arguably, one type of implicit attitude. The derivation
takes a very strong form of Millianism for granted and, plausibly, assumes that con-
scious, reective individuals can reliably form true higher-order beliefs about their
own propositional attitudes. Using only variables, at t, Lois #2 tokens a V -ing of Fa and
a W -ing of Gb. Assuming that she knows some symbolic logic, she can then always
derive the proposition that, at t, she believes that λx[λy〈she tokened a V -ing of Fx
and a W -ing of Gy〉a]b. And since in this case it is true that a= b the imagined Millian
theorist must predict that there is only a single object o to which Lois #2 refers in
deriving the λ-sentence. Thus, given these assumptions, the logician Lois #2 must
derivatively and implicitly believe (1) or something very much like it.
Lois #2 does not explicitly believe the negation of (1) at t, yet this can also be
derived from her beliefs at t. To make the point briey, if one were to put (1) to her
in the form of a question, she would respond negatively if she responds honestly and
in accordance with her actual beliefs. Here is the question I have in mind: ‘Do you
believe that having the property of being an x such that you have a token hope that
x saves you and you have a token wonder whether x reads Shakespeare applies to
a single object o, o being either the object to which you refer by ‘Superman’ or the
object to which you refer by ‘Clark Kent’?’ Again, assuming that she knows some
logic, Lois #2 ought to understand such contorted questions perfectly. It seems, then,
that Lois #2 implicitly believes a contradiction.
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Thus, if a two-tiered Fregean semantics can be motivated by taking Lois #1-type
cases as data it should be equally well motivated by Lois #2-type cases. This contention
is one reason for making the Frege model of confusion so general. The denition is the
most general formulation of the reason many theorists believe in Fregean senses or
something playing the role of such senses, such as Salmon’s (1986) pragmatic ‘guises.’4
This also has the surprising consequence that suspending belief in the identity of an
object about which one has explicit propositional attitudes at a specic time may
amount to being confused.
3 The objection from unavailable representation
Joseph Camp (2002: 33) and Millikan (1994: 97) have voiced similar arguments against
something like the Frege model, claiming that the relevant representations of identity
are unavailable to the confused thinker.5 They state the objection in terms of com-
binatory confusion, which I will do here as well since it is more intuitive. But the
application to separatory confusion is explained at the end of the section. Following
Millikan (ibid.), imagine that Bill and Bi are identical twins and A, their acquaintance,
has met both of them on multiple occasions. But A has never seen both of them at
the same time and has in fact enjoyed Bill’s company for exactly the same amount of
time as Bi’s. Neither person commands a dominant role over the other in A’s mental
economy.6 To make things easier for us (the theorists), assume this is some sort of
ploy, and the twins have intentionally led A to believe that they are a single person
called ‘Phil.’
4If it is right that Lois #2 has inconsistent beliefs then this would be avoided as soon as one adopted
a Fregean theory of content. According to a typical theory of this sort the proposition believed by
Lois #2 can only contain modes of presentation (call them ‘MPs’), never the objects themselves. The
derivation of (1) fails on Fregean assumptions because there are, we can suppose, only two modes of
presentation that Lois #2 can possibly associate with the occurrence of ‘o’ at the end of (1). First, there
is the MP she associates with the name ‘Clark Kent.’ At t, however, Lois #2 did not token a hope the
content of which had her mode of presentation of Clark Kent as a component, thus this cannot be
the MP associated with ‘o’ in (1). Second, there is the ‘Superman’-MP. At t, Lois #2 did not token a
wondering whether the content of which had the ‘Superman’-MP as a component, thus this cannot be
the MP associated with ‘o’ in (1). Therefore, there is no Fregean interpretation of the λ-expression in
(1) on which the claim made by it can be true and thus (1) cannot be derived. Therefore, Fregeanism
saves Lois #2 from irrationality because only the negation of (1) can actually be derived from the set
of her beliefs at t.
5Ruth Marcus (1981, 1983, 1990) appears to toe the same line when she argues that it is impossible
to believe what is metaphysically impossible (cf. Richard 2013).
6Camp (2002: ch. 3) develops, at some length, the example of Fred and the ant colony, to make sure
that it is possible to have cases of such pure and complete combinatory confusion. His argument is
compelling. See also Lawlor (2007: 162).
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If we go along with the popular ‘mental le’ metaphor, A puts all the information
gathered from any epistemic encounter with Bill or Bi into the very same mental
le, labelled with a single ‘tag’—represented linguistically as ‘Phil.’7 Here, we need a
working distinction between the language, or other system of mental representation,
used by the confused person and the language used by the theorist in describing and
explaining the confused mental state. Call the theorists’ idiolect ‘t-language’ and the
confused person’s idiolect ‘c-language.’ The c-language contains singular terms that
correspond to mental representations which either (i) mentally combine two objects
into one or, together with another representation, (ii) mentally separate one object
into two. Accordingly, we can call such singular terms in the c-language confused (or
‘c-terms’ for short).
For sake of argument, then, let us assume that A’s c-language contains no more
than one singular term or mental representation of Bill/Bi, because all the relevant
information is contained in but a single mental repository with a single tag. According
to the objection from unavailable representation this scenario makes it impossible,
in any reasonable sense, for A to have two distinct representations, one of Bill and
the other of Bi. But then the Frege model cannot be right, at least not as a model of
someone like A, as it clearly requires this to be possible. If someone like A exists, the
model must be wrong.
Camp and Millikan state the objection, then, as a reductio of (2).
(2) A believes that Bill = Bi.
In A’s c-idiolect there is one relevant singular term ‘Philc,’ and, according to Camp
and Millikan, there are only three possible ways of assigning reference to it. It must
refer only to Bill or only to Bi or to Bill/Bi. Double brackets ‘J K’ represent functions
from expressions to their referents or semantic values.
(3) JPhilcK = Bill
(4) JPhilcK = Bi
(5) JPhilcK = Bill/Bi
The last interpretation (5) is construed, according to the Millikan model, such that
Bill/Bi is a spatially discontinuous object consisting of two distinct objects, Bill and
Bi. But, according to the objection from unavailable representation, none of the
interpretations in (3)–(5) can make (2) come out true. If (3) is true, then how does A
7See, e.g., Lawlor (2001); Millikan (2000); Perry (2012); Recanati (2012). It is not to my purpose to
evaluate the theory of mental les as such here. The framework is part and parcel of the objection, as I
understand it, and it is assumed here for sake of argument.
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manage to think a thought ‘of Bi’? As Camp (2002: 33) would put it, if (3) is true then
A ‘cannot think anything at all’ of Bi and, therefore, cannot believe that Bill = Bi.
A could only represent the belief that Philc = Philc, but, assuming (3) is true, that is
clearly not the same as believing that Bill= Bi. Same applies mutatis mutandis when
(4) is assumed.
But what about (5)? Well, according to Millikan this is similarly problematic. For
(2) to be true on this assumption, A ‘should have to have a thought of Bill and another
of Bi, which thoughts [A] was disposed to coidentify. But a thought of Bill that is
other than [A’s] thought of Bi is exactly what [A does not] have’ (Millikan 1994: 97).
Therefore, again, (2) cannot be true and the Frege model is demonstrably false.
Camp and Millikan both conclude that combinatory confusion cannot consist in
having a false identity belief. But ultimately the objection does not work. There are
two reasonable responses to it. First, one could insist that the singular term ‘Philc’ is
ambiguous. There will be possible contexts in which the speaker denitely intends
to refer to Bill by an utterance containing ‘Philc’ and contexts where Bi is clearly
intended. This seems possible because the contextual salience of the other person can
be so low as to make the confusion practically irrelevant (more on this in §4.1 below).
Thus some tokenings, on some occasions, may be about Bill and some tokenings about
Bi (and perhaps some are also about the Bill/Bi amalgam). The ambiguity is, surely,
lost on A, but others might become aware that in A’s c-idiolect ‘Philc’ sometimes refers
to Bill and sometimes to Bi. Then it is, at the very least, possible for A to believe
falsely, and explicitly, that Bill = Bi.8
Neither Camp nor Millikan takes this option at all seriously. But this is of course a
feature of the popular mental les model of singular cognition: each individual object
is causally connected to a singular le or concept—and any confusion leads to a kind
of corruption. The linguistic item in question is tied to that singular mental le. Still,
once the distinction between c-languages and t-languages has been made clear it
seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that combinatorily confused singular terms
are ambiguous since they are always paired with (at least) two unconfused terms in
the t-language (more on this presently). Yet, to construct a stronger argument, I will
assume that ‘Philc’ cannot be ambiguous.9
The concession poses no problem, however. The objection from unavailable repre-
8To illustrate, consider the following example. ‘Bank’ is ambiguous. Assume that A falsely believes
‘bank’ is not ambiguous and refers only to nancial institutions. B says to A: ‘Meet me at the bank,’
intending to refer to a river bank. A may then explicitly form the following false belief: the concept of
‘bank’ employed by B is identical to the concept of ‘bank’ employed by me.
9Indeed, if ‘Philc’ is an item in some mental representational system then, or so some have argued,
it cannot be ambiguous in the way described. Thoughts do not appear to be ambiguous in the way
natural language sentences so appear (see, e.g., Fodor 1978: 198–200).
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sentation can be countered more powerfully without making any assumptions at all
about the actual content of a confused singular term like ‘Philc.’ The question, What
is the actual referent of confused singular terms? is not as fundamental as Camp and
Millikan seem to think. Confused identity can be captured and dened without com-
mitting to a specic view on that thorny issue. Armed with the Frege model and the
distinction between c-language and t-language, this is exactly what I propose to do.
Let us start by making the distinction itself more precise. This can be done by
introducing two methodological constraints into the dialectic. First, suppose that for
any confused singular term ac in the c-language, ac can only be mentioned and never
used in the theorists’ t-language. Otherwise, we will automatically assume that the
theorist is confused. That is clearly to be avoided. Second, for any confused singular
term ac in the c-language, the t-language must contain unconfused counterparts. An
unconfused counterpart is a singular term at in the idiolect of an unconfused speaker,
such that if the confused speaker became privy to the truth, they would probably, from
then on, intend to use at to refer to the object thereby referred to by the unconfused
speaker. So when I explain that Billt and Bit are dierent people, the confused hearer
should try, from then on, to incorporate ‘Billt’ and ‘Bit’ into their idiolect while ban-
ishing the use of the corresponding ‘Philc.’ Generally speaking then, in combinatory
confusion, c-term ac is paired with two t-terms, at and bt: 〈ac, 〈at, bt〉〉. Normally, in
separatory confusion, two c-terms, ac and bc, are paired with two unconfused t-terms,
at and bt, thus: 〈〈ac, bc〉, 〈at, bt〉〉. (Think of the ‘Cicero’/‘Tully’ example here.)
If such expression-pairs occur in the wild, all of them may turn out to be ho-
mophones. In Kripke’s (1979: 153) example of separatory confusion, the c-speaker
mistakes Paderewski for two distinct individuals, calling each ‘Paderewski.’ This c-
language fragment then contains two confused names ‘Paderewskic1’ and ‘Paderew-
skic2’ paired with only a single unconfused counterpart—a special feature of homo-
phonic separatory confusions—‘Paderewskit’ in the t-language. The inverse Pader-
ewski case (cf. Recanati 2012: 141–142) is a case of combinatory confusion involving
homophones. Imagine another c-speaker who takes two individuals, P1 and P2, to
be one and both happen to be named ‘Paderewski.’ Here we must assume, as in the
Bill/Bi case, that neither P1 nor P2 can lay a claim to being the ‘dominant causal
source’ of the c-speaker’s practice of uttering the name or of the attendant mental
representation (cf. Lawlor 2007: 162). That is, P1 and P2 are equally responsible for
causing the relevant representations of the c-speaker. In this case the c-language con-
tains a single name, ‘Paderewskic,’ which is paired with two unconfused counterparts,
‘Paderewskit1’ and ‘Paderewskit2,’ in the t-language. I will try to avoid homophonic
examples in what follows, for sake of sanity and all that is good and holy.
This way of making the distinction between t-languages and c-languages is general
enough to be accepted by both sides of the debate. On the Frege model, however, the
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relation between the two languages runs deeper. It is committed to the claim that the t-
language must be used to accurately describe the mental state of a thinker who is using
a c-language as a medium of conscious thought or a means of communication. So, for
example, if there is a language of thought, some individual formulas in the confused
speaker’s language of thought are best described in a t-language. Confused speakers
systematically misrepresent their internal representational systems. But, of course,
this is just what the Millikan model denies. On that view, the internal representational
system is best described via the speaker’s own c-language idiolect. Notice, however,
that neither model depends on the language of thought hypothesis being true. If it
is false, the models can still claim that they are the best theoretical descriptions we
have, at a certain level of abstraction, of the underlying nature of the relevant mental
states.
Now the argument from unavailable representation can be properly refuted. In
cases of confusion the relevant singular representations of the agent must be brack-
eted as scrambled and corrupt by the theorist. In particular, such c-terms cannot be
incorporated directly into the t-language (of course they can always be mentioned
and put into quotes). But as theorists, we want to give the clearest explanation of the
agent’s behavior, communicative or otherwise. We also want to be able to say what
is happening when, as we would put it in the t-language, the confused person won-
ders whether, or supposes that, two objects are the same or one object is actually two.
And, unsurprisingly, attributing false identity beliefs to agents who may themselves
be quite unable to represent those beliefs explicitly will do the explanatory work re-
quired. Thus, when A combinatorily confuses Billt and Bit, as shown in dispositions
to make certain inferences and assumptions in particular contexts, the theorist ought
to explain A’s behavior by attributing to A an implicit identity belief that happens
to be false. For instance, A will have a complex variety of dispositions to think and
express false identities where the identity sign is anked by two demonstratives ‘this’
and ‘that.’ One of them may refer to an object of current perception while the other
refers to an object represented by a memory image. Further, when A wonders whether
Billt is Bit we can neatly describe A’s mental state in the t-language as: wondering
whether Billt and Bit are one or two people.
One can easily allow, then, that the confused agent could indeed have thoughts that
are ‘of Bill’ and thoughts that are of ‘of Bi.’ Also, remember that the agent’s ‘Philc’-
representations have two unconfused counterparts in the t-language, ‘Billt’ and ‘Bit.’
And these representations are the perfect t for the theorist who wishes to explain A’s
‘Philc’-related thought and behavior. Echoing what Stuart Hampshire said in a similar
context, someone may be unable to explicitly think that p, while their behavior can
only be explained by the hypothesis that they believe that p, given that it is known
The objection from unavailable representation 11
that they believe that q.10
If one explicitly believes that p at time t then, let us suppose, some corresponding
mental representation is tokened in one’s internal ‘belief box’ at t. The mental repre-
sentation, further, has a content that is specied by the that-clause (cf. Fodor 1987).
Philosophers recognize at least two kinds of implicit belief. First, there are derived
beliefs, namely beliefs that can be swiftly derived from the set of one’s explicit beliefs.
Thus, if one believes explicitly that the number of planets is 8, one thereby believes
implicitly that the number of planets is lower than 50 (cf. Schwitzgebel 2013). This
characterizes the relevant beliefs of the logician Lois #2 discussed in §2.1 above. Sec-
ondly, there are governing or guiding beliefs or attitudes. These can be rules, laws, or
biases in accordance with which mental processes move from one explicit representa-
tion to another (e.g. Dennett 1978: ch. 6; Fodor 1985). Confused beliefs are more like
the latter kind. Just like many types of bias they can be implicit and unconscious, but
they can still become the objects of explicit belief later. The agent is, however, unable
to swiftly derive the confused belief from their set of explicit beliefs. But postulating
the belief is the best way we have, as theorists, to describe their relevant mental states
and explain and predict some of their actions. Consider a very simple example. Sup-
pose Bella confuses Billt and Bit and uses ‘Billc’ for both of them. She meets Bit
and says, ‘Hi Billc.’ How do the folk explain why Bella uttered the wrong name? Well,
simply by saying that she believes that that man in front of her, i.e. Bit, is identical
to Billt. People give such explanations all the time, and this practice does not appear
suspect.
The Camp-Millikan argument could only be evidence for the view that confused
speakers can have no explicit beliefs of the form ‘X is Y,’ but according to the Frege
model the belief in question can be either explicit or implicit. The point can be made by
saying that, since the theorist should not be allowed to simply adopt the language of
the speaker in question, one is compelled to endorse a kind of local interpretationism
about confused beliefs. Global Dennettian interpretationism holds, roughly, that a
creature’s belief that p is constituted by the fact that attributing this belief to the
creature explains its behavior in an ecacious and simple manner. This, it is hoped, can
be done without committing to substantive theses about an internal representational
system or language of thought (cf. Dennett 1982, 1991).
The local interpretationism envisaged here, as applied to object-confusion, holds
that the Frege model provides the best and most intuitive theoretical description of the
confused thinker’s internal mental state, at a particular level of abstraction. The view
10Cited in Dennett (1982: 164n16). Anticipating the problem of this paper, Hampshire goes on to
write in the sentence following: ‘Perhaps the confusion in his mind cannot be conveyed by any simple
account of what he believes: perhaps only a reproduction of the complexity and confusion will be
accurate’ (1975: 123).
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is thus at home with representationalist theories of mind and should be construed as a
theory of the nature and structure of confused mental states. Interpretationism enters
the picture at the level of public language, both when it functions as a medium of
conscious thought and as a means of communication. The Fregean insists that these
linguistic items need to undergo reinterpretation, for they do not accurately reect
the underlying mental states. Specically, the theorists needs the resources of the
Frege model to plausibly describe the mental state of a speaker who utters a confused
singular term or employs it to think confused thoughts, even if it is in terms which are
not directly available to the thinker. Generally speaking, there is nothing particularly
special about this, since the thinker’s own construal of their mental states should not
always be privileged over the theorist’s anyway (more on this in §3.1 below).
Global interpretationism need not be embraced here, as other unconfused singular
terms will be shared between the speaker and the theorist. And the theorist can, then,
posit explicit internal representations and mental states without any reinterpretation
of the speaker’s public language expressions. In that case, the theorist does not auto-
matically commit to any errors by using the same public language singular terms as
the one who is confused.
It is quite natural to think that the objection from unavailable representation could
not be made in terms of separatory confusion. I suspect that this is the view implicit
in Camp and Millikan. As a reviewer for this journal notes,
[w]ith separatory confusion, there are enough concepts to allow for the
formation of intelligible identity statements, and so the Frege model can
stand here, even without invoking the resources of implicit belief, at least
so far as the objection from unavailable representation goes.
Clearly, this would make the objection to the Frege model even weaker but, by my
lights, this natural thought is not quite true. Explaining how this is so helps to clarify
the dierence between the two models of confusion. In combinatory confusion, ac-
cording to Millikan, the confused thinker has no conception of an object which is not
also, at the same time, a conception of some other object. This makes the individual
concept itself corrupt and confused. By parity of reasoning, in separatory confusion,
the confused thinker should have no conception of an object which is not also, at the
same time, a conception of something which is not that very object. So, Lois Lane
has no conception of Superman, the thought would go, which is not also, at the same
time, a conception of something which is not Clark Kent, i.e. not Superman. This
would, according my construal of the Millikan model, make the concept confused. It
should be clear, however, that this would complicate the dialectic considerably, and
neither Millikan nor Camp seems to endorse an argument of this sort, thus I focus
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on combinatory cases. Millikan’s broader theoretical commitments may even make
such an argument dicult to formulate within a teleosemantic framework. Perhaps
the complications are such as to make the objection from unavailable representation
less plausible overall but, even so, this would clearly not undermine my overarching
point in this section.
3.1 Descriptive and explanatory adequacy
As emphasized by Ruth Marcus (1983), if a theory of confused belief is to be descrip-
tively adequate it must make room for the fact that nonlinguistic animals and prelin-
guistic infants are just as confusion-susceptible as other more intellectually sophisti-
cated creatures. Despite appearances to the contrary, the Millikan model holds no ad-
vantage in this respect. Using the t-language, the Fregean theorist can assign implicit
identity beliefs to nonlinguistic agents if such are required, for example, to explain
their behavior. Camp, Marcus, and Millikan seem to be driven, in dierent ways, by
the intuition that confusion-susceptibility is cognitively more basic than the ability
to think thoughts about or involving identity. If thoughts can be implicit, either in the
sense of being derivative or governing propositional attitudes, the intuition is arguably
mistaken. On the Frege model the mental state of confusion is explained in terms of
such attitudes even when the subject is not in explicit possession of the concepts of
identity and distinctness of objects.
Strictly speaking, the Frege model and the Millikan model, as presented here, are
only intended as theories of the mental state of confused identity, i.e. a certain type of
cognitive malfunction. Obviously, however, the two models will mesh dierently with
theories of corresponding nonconfused mental states, i.e. theories explaining our ca-
pacity to successfully reidentify objects in thought or perception. Indeed, according to
Millikan herself the ‘... central job of cognition is the ... task of reidentifying individuals,
properties, kinds, and so forth, through diverse media and under diverse conditions’
(2000: xi). And her theory of confusion is certainly intended to complement her theory
of this central cognitive ability.
In this section I will briey sketch how one might naturally extend the Frege model
to cover successful reidentication and contrast this with what I take to be Millikan’s
account. There is not enough space here to argue that the Frege model is right and the
Millikan model is wrong about these cases and, fortunately, this is not necessary for
the purposes of this paper. The proponent of the Frege model can in fact embrace much
of the Millikan model, only insisting, along the way, that implicit or explicit belief in
propositions involving identity ought to be postulated when possible and explanatorily
fruitful. We have already seen how this works in cases of confusion but the Fregean
will, at the very least, maintain that some cases of successful reidentication are to be
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explained by attributing propositional attitudes as well.
According to Millikan’s more functionalist picture, reidentication is explained
by the capacity to recognize when two thought tokens are thoughts of the same. And,
surely, this does not imply that the agent must explicitly represent that the subject
of one thought token is identical to the subject of another thought token.11 I note here
that part of her argument for this view is, precisely, that it is impossible to describe
confusion in terms of belief states. As we have seen this is wrong.
The Fregean, by contrast, will either hold that any case of successful reidentication
is best explained by appeal to the assumption that the thinker implicitly believes in a
true proposition involving identity, or that at least some cases must be so explained. I
illustrate the stronger version here—noting where it might be weakened.
To borrow Fodor’s (1985: 24) example, let us assume some type of associationism
about mental processes. Imagine, further, that there is a ‘principle of association by
proximity’ in virtue of which thoughts of salt are usually associated with thoughts
of pepper. The principle is then a guiding or law-like attitude which explains why
salt-thoughts and pepper-thoughts are invariably linked in trains of thought. But the
principle itself need not be explicitly represented in the mind. According to standard
representational theories of the mind, however, the condiment-thoughts themselves
must be explicitly represented.
Something similar happens, on the Frege model, whenever a train of thought
contains dierent thoughts that are supposed to be about the very same object. This
can occur, for example, in inferences. When a thinker infers that Cicero is an orator
from the belief that Cicero is tall and an orator, they assume that they are thinking
about the same object twice. Although there is no need to assume that they explicitly
believe or entertain the thought that Cicero= Cicero it helps to explain their inferential
behavior if we assume that they believe this implicitly. Here, the weaker variety would
hold that such an implicit belief is only needed when the inference involves two names
which the thinker takes to be distinct. So, we would need the belief that Cicero= Tully,
for example, to explain success in such a case. And if—as Millikan asserts in one of
her discussions (1994: 97)—we are not allowed to attribute any such belief to them,
explicit or implicit, it would be unclear how to explain this piece of behavior at all,
other than referring to it as the manifestation of a ‘capacity.’
On the stronger extension of the Frege model, implicit identity beliefs, when true,
always form part of the explanation of simple inferences like the one from Fa to Fa.
11As John Campbell (2002: 97–101) likes to put it, when one identies o at t and reidenties o at
a later time t′ one must at least be ‘trading on’ the identity of o at t and t′. Relatedly, Tyler Burge
(2010, e.g. 286–287, 460) argues extensively that creatures need not be capable of thinking the ‘criteria
for reidentication’ in order to reidentify individuals and objects. Mere ‘perceptual tracking’ counts as
reidentication.
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And, correspondingly, such inferences can fail on account of the thinker’s false identity
beliefs regarding a or, if you will, on account of the thinker’s lack of the true beliefs.
It is a virtue of the stronger version that it gives a uniform account of success and
failure characteristic of mental representations involving identity and distinctness.
In separatory confusion the thinker fails to infer Fb from Fa and the unconfused
succeeds in doing so. So Lois Lane fails to infer facts about Clark Kent from facts
about Superman. In combinatory confusion the thinker fails by wrongly inferring Fb
from Fa and the unconfused successfully blocks any such inference. So A wrongly
infers facts about Bi from facts about Bill (as we describe it in the t-language), i.e.
wrongly trades on the identity of non-identical objects.
As already mentioned, I will not argue for this extension of the model here, and
there are many strong and intuitive objections to consider. For example, one might
suppose that explaining reidentication in this way leads to an innite regress since
one would always need a further belief in identity to explain the move from a term in
the inference to the terms in the identity belief itself, and again ad innitum. Further-
more, it may seem like when a thinker successfully ‘trades on’ identity in very simple
inferences, postulating the identity belief would be explanatorily superuous. I hope
to address these worries elsewhere, but here I only observe that the weaker version of
the Frege model is not subject to them and may represent a middle ground between
the two views.12
Still, I want to develop two general considerations suggesting that one ought to
prefer the Frege model as a theory of confusion. Firstly, those, like Millikan, who
suppose that accepting or rejecting identities reduces without remainder to acts of
connecting or disconnecting dots or les in a mental network tend to think that there
is no such thing as judgments of identity. Thus, she writes that,
as distinguished from an identity statement or assertion, there is no such
thing as an identity judgement. It is not the job of an identity sentence to
induce a belief. Its job is to induce an act of coidentifying. (2000: 172)
As Papineau and Shea (2002: 463) aptly point out, after quoting this very passage, we
bear many attitudes to propositional identities other than acceptance and rejection. For
example we can wonder whether Bill is Bi or entertain the supposition that Bill is Bi,
and these propositional attitudes do not seem to reduce neatly to acts of connecting
or disconnecting mental les (or dispositions to perform such acts). Propositional
identities do have, as Millikan argues, distinctive eects on the functional organization
of mental states. But they can also be the objects of a multitude of propositional
attitudes. Thus there is reason to doubt that Millikan’s view has the resources to
12I want to thank a reviewer for this journal for helpful comments on these issues.
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explain all the psychological phenomena associated with identity beliefs or identity
statements.
No such worry attaches to the Frege model. There are identity beliefs, even if they
must sometimes be couched in terms dierent from those employed by the believer,
if the believer has a language at all. But this is true more generally: beliefs of pre-
linguistic humans and nonhuman animals being among the clearest examples. Local
interpretationism holds that the same can be true of rational adults. Their utterances
need to be systematically reinterpreted in order correctly describe the underlying
mental state. In a forthcoming paper, I argue that many cases of malapropism should
be treated in like manner (Unnsteinsson forthcoming). I call this the misarticulation
theory of malaprops. For example, when John Kerry slips and utters, ‘Wasabi is a
dangerous sect,’ but meant to utter the word ‘Wahabi’ instead of ‘Wasabi,’ we ought to
construe him as actually having expressed the proposition he intended to express and
not the one he apparently expressed. /wasabi/ was, on this occasion, his erroneous
way of pronouncing /wahabi/. This is true even if the slip is persistent, i.e. one which
occurs consistently and repeatedly in Kerry’s speeches. Object-confusion is a more
deep-seated error but it also requires some degree of reinterpretation: to describe the
mental state of the speaker adequately one must avoid taking the words uttered at
face value.
Thus the Frege model surpasses the Millikan model in explanatory power, if in-
deed the latter eschews implicit identity beliefs altogether. And this brings us to the
second consideration. It seems reasonable to think that no model of confusion can
genuinely avoid postulating identity beliefs or some roughly equivalent propositional
attitude. The reason for this is the distinction between t-languages and c-languages.
If the theorist is to remain unconfused while explaining the behavior, inferential or
otherwise, of a confused agent, they can only ever mention confused terms from the
c-language. But if this requirement is accepted, and I see no reason to why it should
not, the Millikan model must postulate false identity beliefs or similar belief-like states.
To see this, let us try to state the Millikan model as precisely as possible.
Millikan model of confusion
Speaker A suers from identity confusion at time t i for any propositional
attitudes V and W that A explicitly holds at t, either (1) or (2) is true:
1. (i) A Vs F (the referent of ‘ac’ in A’s c-idiolect), (ii) A Ws G(the referent
of ‘bc’ in A’s c-idiolect), and (iii) at = bt but A’s ‘ac’/‘bc’-representations
presuppose that at 6= bt.
2. (i) A Vs F (the referent of ‘ac’ in A’s c-idiolect), and (ii) at 6= bt but A’s
‘ac’-representations presuppose that at = bt.
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In (1) the speaker suers from separatory confusion and ‘ac’ and ‘bc’ are paired with
corresponding terms in the t-language. For instance, ‘Superman’ in the c-language is
paired with ‘Superman’ in the t-language, and so on. (2) is combinatory confusion and
‘ac’ is paired with two corresponding terms in the t-language. If A uses ‘Billc’ to refer
to what the t-speaker refers with both ‘Billt’ and ‘Bit’ these are paired together. Once
the distinction between the c-language and t-language is made there is no reason to
keep to the terminology that was introduced before in explaining the Millikan model.
That is, we need not say, in (1), that the c-speaker refers to a spatially discontinuous
object consisting of two distinct objects. Nor that, in (2), the c-speaker purports to refer
to a nonexistent object that consists of itself and not itself at the same time. Millikan’s
model aimed at bringing in the actual content of items in the confused speaker’s inner
representational system. But this is not necessary, as the mental state of confusion
can be dened without mentioning those contents. This is good since the model need
not take a stand on particular content-assignments in these puzzling cases.
But what does it mean to say that representations in the c-language ‘presuppose
that at = bt or that at 6= bt’? Roughly, that the way in which A uses these representa-
tions is best explained by assuming that A implicitly believes one or the other. The
representations ‘function as if’ they were representing a single object while they
actually represent two objects. Or the representations ‘function as if’ they were rep-
resenting two objects while they actually represent no object at all. In other words,
the relevant parts of A’s behavior are neatly explained by assuming that their explicit
mental representations are governed by false identity claims. Since theorists are not
restricted to using the language of the subject under discussion they are free to use
the identity sign to capture these facts in a clear and precise fashion. And nothing
seems to compete, in terms of clarity, with using the identity sign in these cases.
The Millikan model tries to describe confused identity merely in terms of (corrupt)
functional organization of mental states, rather than in terms of propositional beliefs.
Remember, however, that the argument from unavailable representation, on which
the model is based, only purported to show that identity beliefs were in some sense
impossible in cases of confusion. Since this argument fails the motivation for doing
away with propositional belief is no longer a factor and we are free to use them to
explain corepresentational capacities and their characteristic failures.
4 Proper functions and malfunctions
Given that I’ve shown that the Frege model best explains the mental state of confusion,
we don’t need to construe confusion as ‘an error of its own kind’ (Millikan 2000: 173),
as opposed to a false belief. Even so, I’ll now go on to argue that confusion in fact
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constitutes a distinctive kind of malfunction, one that we can even characterize in
something like Millikan’s own terms while still accepting the Frege model as the true
metaphysics of confusion.
First: what is a proper function? The notion is, of course, borrowed from evo-
lutionary biology (Millikan 1984, 1989b, 1989a). One item can serve many dierent
functions at the same time but usually only a subset of these functions actually helps
explain why the item continues to be reproduced. Consider the human heart. It seems
to have many dierent eects on the body and environment. For example, the heart
makes the human body heavier, emits a low thumping sound, and pumps blood. Only
the last is plausibly thought of as the proper function of human hearts, because it
is historically responsible for the fact that hearts are reproduced. Importantly, how-
ever, an item that does not actually pump blood can still be a heart. Malformed and
malfunctioning hearts are still ‘supposed to’ pump blood, i.e. serve the proper func-
tion whereby their proliferation is evolutionarily and historically explained. Going
further, Millikan applies the notion of proper function to biological and cultural items
alike. Thus, according to her, linguistic devices (words, syntactic forms, etc.) have
their own proper functions. For example, the proper function of the indicative mood
is the production of a belief in the hearer that corresponds to the meaning of the in-
dicative sentence uttered. The imperative mood has the proper function of producing
compliant behavior. If I say ‘Pass the salt’ and my interlocutor then passes the salt,
my imperative utterance has successfully performed its proper function. The proper
function can also be called the ‘stabilizing’ function of the item, since it is responsible
for perpetuating the occurrence of the item in a linguistic community.
Gloria Origgi and Dan Sperber (2000) argue that Millikan’s theory gets this part
wrong because it is not necessary that imperative utterances typically or reliably
produce compliant behavior, or even that they produce in the hearer a desire to comply.
On their view it is more plausible to say that imperative utterances function properly
when the speaker succeeds in guiding the hearer towards the correct interpretation, so
the hearer understands which course of action would satisfy the imperative utterance.
Compliance is an additional step that depends entirely on the hearer’s own beliefs,
desires, and intentions.
But even if imperatives produced compliance only on very rare occasions, it might
still be the case, at least on Millikan’s theory as I understand it, that their proper func-
tion is to produce compliant behavior. Millikan has emphasized that proper functions
have nothing to do with typicality, reliability, or statistical averages (1989b: 21–22;
1989a: 93–94; 1984: 4, respectively). All that is required, on her view, is that an expla-
nation of why imperatives are reproduced essentially invokes historical occasions on
which imperatives in fact caused compliance. A sequence of such occasions would
then explain why imperatives were selected for by a process analogous to natural
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selection. Millikan denes ‘normal conditions’ as the actual conditions that have been
historically needed for an item to perform its proper function. In the case at hand, the
normal conditions might involve things like the hearer’s understanding, the speaker’s
command of the hearer’s language, and the hearer’s willingness to do as told.13 The
fact that hearts function to pump blood is explained by a history of normal hearts
pumping blood in the normal way under normal conditions. As Millikan (1984: 56)
puts it: ‘If no token of the imperative mood ever eected more than an abortive at-
tempt or intention to comply with it, it is clear that speakers would soon cease to use
the imperative forms at all or to use them as they now do.’
On Millikan’s (2000) account the distorting eects of confusion on basic cognitive
processes are fairly straightforward. As mentioned above, she argues that a central
task of cognition is to reidentify particulars and properties in thought and perception.
Thus, on her view, we can postulate a basic cognitive mechanism in the mind/brain
with the proper function of reidentication. The mechanism itself, let us suppose,
has proliferated and is perpetuated in humans by a process of dierential reproduc-
tion. The mechanism underlies many important cognitive tasks, such as recognition,
expectation, and inference (cf. Lawlor 2001; Recanati 2012).
If we can describe such a mental mechanism, at some requisite level of abstraction,
combinatory and separatory confusions—as dened by the Frege model—are clearly
the most characteristic ways in which it breaks down and fails to perform its proper
function. Its function is to keep track of particulars in the world and false identity
beliefs give rise to systematic and characteristic patterns of cognitive failure. For
example, if A expects Bill (or Bi, or Bill/Bi, or the referent of ‘Bill’ in A’s language,
etc.) to knock on the door in ve minutes while implicitly believing falsely that Bill
= Bi, then A’s reidenticatory capacity is disrupted because A’s belief makes the
relevant identications unreliable. Repeated and chronic confusion indicates that the
underlying mechanism itself is impaired.
4.1 The proper function of singular terms in communication
Finally, let us apply the notion of proper function to singular terms in a natural lan-
guage. Millikan holds that the stabilizing function of a proper name—a paradigm
example of a singular term—is to ‘precipitate an act of identication of its referent’
(1984: 80). At a high level of abstraction this sounds plausible. But I much prefer to
describe the function of names in the more Gricean terms of utterances providing
evidence for the speaker’s referential intention.14 But, to keep the argument simple
13Cf. Godfrey-Smith’s (1994: 265–266) discussion of the neck-expanding display of the frill-necked
lizard.
14Cf. Bach (1987); Grice (1989); Schier (1981); Unnsteinsson (2014, 2016); Wilson & Sperber (2012).
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and intuitive I have stated it in Millikan’s own terminology, only reverting to the more
detailed Gricean vocabulary when needed. In my view, the theories complement each
other quite naturally.
Intuitively, if all singular term tokens would become confused, speakers would
soon cease to utter them or they would acquire some distinct function. This intuition
seems, however, to depend on the assumption that members of the linguistic com-
munity in question are all confused in dierent ways about dierent things or that
some are confused and some are not. Matters are very dierent when a whole group
of speakers, for example a whole scientic community, is uniformly confused about
the identity of objects or properties to which they intend to refer in speech (Camp
2002: ch. 2; Evans 1982: ch. 11; Field 1973). As Hartry Field argues, using ‘mass’ as an
example, such global confusion of two dierent properties or natural kinds makes the
reference of a term metaphysically indeterminate. Although such cases are interesting
in their own right, I want to leave them to one side. I want to argue, rather, that in
cases where the confused agents are perfectly capable—by being a bit more careful or
discerning—of seeing things aright, the function of singular term utterances becomes
corrupt in principle. More precisely, the utterance will precipitate two conicting acts
of identication (combinatory confusion) or no such act at all (separatory confusion).
And this is not due to Fieldian indeterminacy.
Thus, to focus on local rather than global confusions, assume that the speaker’s (A)
language is a c-language and the hearer’s (B) language is an unconfused t-language.
First, I give the argument in terms of combinatory confusion. Then we move on to
separatory confusion.
Corruption in combinatory confusion. Assume, rst, that A utters ‘. . .Billc . . .’ on a
particular occasion. And, secondly, that A believes falsely that Billt = Bit. In that case,
A’s utterance simultaneously precipitates the identication of two distinct objects
while its normal stabilizing function is to precipitate the identication of a single
object. And this is precisely because of A’s false identity belief: if A is thoroughly
confused, both individuals will equally count as what A intended to refer to. Someone
may object by saying that, actually, the utterance only precipitates the identication
of Billc, i.e. the man named ‘Bill’ in A’s c-language, whoever that is. But this is wrong,
especially if beliefs determine or constrain referential intentions. To see this consider a
normal unconfused case. I know the truth about Billt not being Bit. If I utter ‘. . .Bill. . .,’
intending to refer to Bill, who is not identical to Bi, my utterance does not precipitate
an act of identication of Bi at the same time. Since my belief is true, no problem
seems to arise. In a similar way, in virtue of A’s false identity belief, A’s utterance
precipitates the identication of two distinct objects, corrupting the proper function
of the utterance.
This argument naturally suggests the following question. What happens when B is
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fully aware of the extent of A’s confusion? Doesn’t that get rid of the corruption, since
the hearer can presumably grasp what the speaker intends? Well, it is not so simple.
Of course the hearer is in a much better epistemic position to discern the speaker’s
mental state, but clearly the function of the speaker’s singular term utterance becomes
corrupted in the the same manner as before. There are still two objects in contention
for identication, since the hearer also knows—remember that we are not considering
global confusion here—that the speaker believes falsely. And if Millikan and others
are right about the proper function of singular terms only a single object should be
in contention.
Should we say instead, perhaps with Millikan on our side, that A’s utterance of
‘. . .Billc . . .’ in fact functions to precipitate the identication of the Billt/Bit amal-
gam? At least this would be a single object of some sort. I think not. It helps to use
Gricean terminology to explain this point clearly. Uttering an ordinary proper name
of English, for example, would never constitute good evidence for an intention to refer
to a gerrymandered object of this kind. Unless, perhaps, both speaker and hearer are
confused in the exact same manner (more on that below). If I alone have the crazy
belief that the apple in my hand is really a mereological fusion, o, of the apple and the
Empire State building, I cannot expect my audience to get the reference to o by simply
uttering ‘This apple tastes great!’ And if it is true, as I think it is, that communicative
intentions are severely constrained by doxastic states, then I cannot even intend for
my audience to get the reference to o since it is quite likely that I will believe, in
such a context, that it is impossible that they will comprehend me as referring to that
gerrymandered object with that expression (see, e.g., Donnellan 1968).
Corruption in separatory confusion. Using the ctive world of Superman as an
example, assume now that A utters ‘. . .Supermanc . . .’ on a particular occasion. And,
secondly, thatA believes falsely that Supermant 6= Clark Kentt. In that case,A’s singular
term utterance precipitates the identication of an object o while, at the same time,
precipitating the identication of an x such that x 6= o. Specically, there is no object
which is Superman while not being Clark Kent and, so, the utterance precipitates the
identication of no actual object while its normal stabilizing function is to precipitate
the identication of a single object. And this is precisely because of A’s false identity
belief. As before, to see this, it helps to consider a normal unconfused case. I know
the truth about Superman being Clark Kent. If I utter ‘. . .Superman. . .,’ intending to
refer to Superman, who is identical to Clark Kent, my utterance also precipitates an
act of identication of Clark Kent. Since my belief is true, no problem seems to arise.
One objection in particular may come to mind here. And the answer is made easier
by using the more detailed Gricean terminology. Is it really the case that A’s utterance,
in the above context, is evidence that A refers or intends to refer to an object o such
that o= Superman and o 6= Clark Kent? Yes, it seems so. For the following is a generally
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sound principle: if E is evidence that A intends to refer to a, and it is true that a = b,
then E is evidence that A intends to refer to b. Bear in mind that the notion of intending
to refer to a should be construed transparently. The principle would not hold water if
it were substituted for an unequivocally opaque notion, such as intending to refer to a
as a or intending to refer to a as b. Similarly, while seeing is transparent, seeing as is
opaque. If I see John and John is my cousin, I also see my cousin. But seeing John as
John does not imply seeing John as my cousin. By the same token, if I intend to refer
to John and John is my cousin, I also intend to refer to my cousin. This remains true
even if I utter (confused) sentences like ‘My cousin and John are not the same person.’
But my false beliefs may, as in the two cases above, create a conict in my referential
intention and corrupt the proper function of the singular term.
Someone like Field may object that my whole argument has a hidden false assump-
tion, namely, that the locally confused speaker can have a determinate referential in-
tention at all. Local confusion is just like global confusion: it gives rise to metaphysical
indeterminacy. Field, I imagine, would go on to argue that there is no point in talking
about conicting evidence for an indeterminate conclusion. On this account, then, the
combinatorily confused speaker, for example, has an intention that refers indetermi-
nately to Billt, Bit, and the Billt/Bit amalgam, and an utterance involving ‘Billc’ or
‘Bic’ (or, as in our original example, ‘Philc’) is good evidence for this indeterminate
intention.
The objection misses the point of the present exercise. If we consider ordinary
proper names and perceptual demonstratives, rather than natural kind predicates like
‘mass’ in Newton’s language, it is clear that even the confused speaker can, on occasion,
have a very determinate intention to refer to an object about which they are confused.
But, in those cases, the part of the linguistic evidence that consists in an utterance
of a confused token of a singular term will still be corrupt, just with a diminished
practical upshot. Here is the kind of case I have in mind. A confuses Billt with Bit
but stands right in front of Billt and utters ‘Billc is right there’ while pointing directly
at him. Assume also that Bit’s contextual salience is quite low. In this case, I suppose,
A could denitely intend to refer to that man there, i.e. Billt. Without doubt, A also
intends to refer to Bit, but this is such an insignicant part of A’s communicative
intention that it seems well nigh irrelevant.
To summarize, the mere presence of false identity beliefs can make it such that sin-
gular term utterances cannot perform their stabilizing proper function of precipitating
an act of object-identication. It is reasonable to suppose, then, that the reproduction
of such terms in natural language needs to be explained by invoking a sequence of
utterances where such confusion was not present at all.
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5 Conclusion
I have argued that identity confusions can be dened as a mental state, characterized by
certain propositional attitudes. Minimally, the confused agent must either not believe
a true proposition about identity or, less minimally, believe a false proposition about
identity. The most serious objections to this account can be staved o by arguing that
the beliefs can be implicit, but still, the agent must stand in some explicit attitude
relations to the object(s) in question. Furthermore, I showed how this mental state
has disrupting eects on the proper function of singular terms in communication.
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